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ARTICLES

IS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE A CRIME?:
INTIMATE PARTNER RAPE AS ALLEGORY
EMILY J. SACK*
INTRODUCTION

By the late 1990s, dramatic changes in official criminal justice
policy toward domestic violence were underway in many areas of
the country. Police and prosecutors were no longer to treat such
violence as a domestic quarrel best settled by family members in
Instead, in many jurisdictions, legislation and
private.
department protocols mandated or promoted arrest and
prosecution in domestic violence incidents, and authorized active
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pursuit and criminalization of civil protection order violations.1
Within a few years after these policies took effect, however,
conflict over their benefits emerged and remains a central issue
in domestic violence policy today. 2 Many concerns over the
policies, particularly the way in which some have been
implemented, are highly legitimate and require ongoing
attention if we are to implement a domestic violence response
that effectively addresses the needs of battered women, while
also holding offenders accountable. 3
However, what continues to be most notable about the changes
in criminal domestic violence policy is how incomplete their
implementation has been. Despite tremendous efforts in
education and training of police, prosecutors and judges, and
enormous amounts of federal money expended on practice
development and improvement, most of us need only turn to our
local paper or courthouse to see examples of widespread failure to
implement effective criminal justice policies for domestic
violence. 4
1 Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1668-73 (2004) (discussing the changes
in states' domestic violence policies); Cheryl Hanna, The Paradoxof Hope: The Crime and
Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1518-20 (1998) (noting
the rise in domestic violence arrests following the implementation of mandatory arrest
policies).
2 For critiques of some criminal domestic violence policies, see, e.g. Aya Gruber, The
Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741 (2007) (positing the current domestic
violence system does not consider the complexity of many victims' situations); Donna
Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical
Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801 (2001) (arguing strategies should be developed that
decrease state control of women).
3 See Sack, supra note 1, passim (examining critiques of the implementation of
domestic violence criminal justice policy); see G. Kristian Miccio, If Not Now, When?
Individual and Collective Responsibility for Male Intimate Violence, 15 WASH. & LEE J.
C.R.. & SOC. JUST. 405, 414-15 (2009) (explaining that while advocating for mandatory
arrest and a criminal response to domestic violence, feminists nevertheless felt a distrust
for law enforcement, and in working with a system that had been a source of the
problem). See Sack, supra note 1, at 1740 (noting advocates for a strong criminal justice
response would also agree that it is only one of many strategies that are critical to the
success of the anti-domestic violence movement); see also Miccio, supra note 3, at 414
(noting mandatory criminal justice response has always been viewed as one component of
a multi-dimensional approach).
4 See, e.g., Veronica Gonzalez, Murder Suspect May Plead In Five Year Old Case,
WILMINGTON
STAR-NEWS,
Feb.
8,
2010,
available
at
http./legal.blogs.starnewsonline.com/10406/murder-suspect-may-plead-in-five-year-oldcase/. Gradie Lee Rhodes was charged with the murder of Joyce Hoskins, who had failed
in two attempts to get protective orders against him. Hoskins was killed just months
after Rhodes was released from prison and was on parole with intense supervision for
murdering another ex-girlfriend. Id. See also Bianca Prieto, Orange County couple's
whirlwind romance ends in murder-suicide,PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 22, 2010, availableat
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The Castle Rock v. Gonzales case is a tragic example of law
5
enforcement's failure to enforce the terms of a protection order.
When her estranged husband took her three children from the
front lawn in violation of a protection order, Jessica Gonzales
alerted police, showed them the order, and tried repeatedly to
explain the danger he posed. 6 But despite her desperate efforts
over several hours to have police enforce the order and arrest her
husband, the officers failed to act. Instead, they told her that
there was nothing they could do, and took a dinner break. 7 The
horrible consequences of this failure became apparent when
Gonzales' husband appeared at the police station and initiated a
shoot-out, causing officers to shoot and kill him.8 The three little
girls were found dead in the back of his car.9
While the end result of the police inaction in Gonzales is
thankfully rare, the police conduct itself is all too common. 10
From this perspective, the central issue becomes not whether the
changes in domestic violence policies should have been
implemented, but why, in many regards, they have not been
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/
crime/orange-county-couple-s-whilrwind-romance-ends-in-190719.
A man who was on
probation for strangling his ex-girlfriend was suspected of killing his wife and them
himself. Police had been called to his home several months prior to the incident when the
suspect was attacking his wife. She obtained a temporary protection order and her
husband was arrested, but then released after a month and a half. Less than two months
later, she was dead. Id.
5 Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
6 Id. at 752- 754.
7 Id. at 753-754.
8 Id. at 754.
9 Id. Jessica Gonzales filed a claim against the town under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming
that her procedural due process rights had been violated when the police failed to enforce
the protection order. Id. The Court held that Jessica Gonzales failed to state a claim
because she did not have a property interest in the enforcement of the order, so that her
procedural due process rights had not been violated. Id. at 768. The Court found that
such a property interest did not exist because, despite language in Colorado's statute
governing arrests for violation of domestic violence orders that police "shall arrest," the
police actually maintained discretion as to whether or not to make an arrest. Id. at 76064.
10 See STATE OF NEW YORK, DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, OFFICE FOR

THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THE FAMILY PROTECTION AND DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE INTERVENTION ACT OF 1994: EVALUATION OF THE MANDATORY ARREST
PROVISIONS, THIRD INTERIM REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 4 (2000)
(assessing impact of New York's mandatory arrest law six years after its enactment,
report noted the low incidence of arrest in domestic violence incidents where perpetrators
were no longer at the scene); see also Miccio, supra note 3, at 433-34 (noting that though
New York's law was not limited to on-scene arrests, the actual police practice of failing to
follow up on offenders who have fled the scene appears to reflect a police attitude of
avoidance or abdication of arrest responsibility in domestic violence cases).
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implemented in any meaningful way.
The problem does not lie primarily with individual criminal
justice practitioners who refuse to cooperate with domestic
violence reforms. Most of these practitioners are both sincere
and well-meaning. Nor does the problem lie in the novelty of the
innovations, since in many instances, the changes in domestic
violence policies have been in place for over a generation. I
believe that the fundamental explanation for the resistance to
full implementation of these changes rests in historical
justifications for the toleration of domestic violence which we
thought we had jettisoned long ago. Yet the legacy of these
justifications continues to shape our beliefs about violence
against women. Do we really believe that domestic violence is a
crime?
In order to explore this question, this Article focuses on a
particular aspect of domestic violence, marital and intimate
partner rape. While the legacy of the rationales for condoning
violence against women may be hidden from view in
contemporary domestic violence policy generally, it is alive and
well in the treatment of marital and intimate partner rape. It is
in the challenges to criminalization of partner rape that the
deepest ambivalence in our views about violence against women
is writ large. Changes in the criminal justice policy toward
domestic violence have been met with significant controversy and
backlash. But unlike a backlash, which assumes that there has
been major progress from which to retreat, the criminalization of
intimate partner rape is a movement that has stalled before it
started. Though the formal barrier to prosecution, the marital
rape exemption, began to be dismantled in the mid-1980s, there
remain legal obstacles as well as informal barriers to full
prosecution of these crimes. Perhaps most significantly, public
opinion appears confused and ambivalent about the prosecution
of these cases. To many, the term "intimate partner rape"
remains an oxymoron. 1l
11 Martha M. Ertman, Sexuality: ContractualPurgatoryfor Sexual Marginorities:Not
Heaven, But Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1107, 1113 n.15 (1996) ("Until recently,
marital rape was an oxymoron because rape was defined as forcible sex with a person not
the defendant's wife. But it has since progressed from a privilege toward a crime.")
(citations omitted); Martha Albertson Fineman, Progressand Progressionin Family Law,
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1 (2004) (stating "'marital rape' is no longer considered an
oxymoron").

20101

IS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE A CRIME?

The current treatment of marital and intimate partner rape
helps to illuminate how domestic violence in general was
addressed in the days before laws and policies concerning
domestic violence were changed. The current state of partner
rape law gives us a picture of how different life would be for
battered women if the criminal justice reforms in domestic
violence had never been implemented. Further, an exploration of
the treatment of partner rape can inform our understanding
about current obstacles to the full development of an effective
criminal response to domestic violence. The study of partner
rape prosecution helps to uncover some of our deepest beliefs
about domestic violence and our resistance to fundamental
change in its criminalization.
In Part I of this Article, I describe the criminal justice response
to domestic violence as it existed in Queens, NY in the early
1990s, as viewed through the facts of a case in which I was
involved. I then explain the role of intimate partner rape in my
case, its connection to battering, and the reasons why an
examination of intimate partner rape can help us to understand
both the need for criminalization of domestic violence, and the
reasons why such criminalization has not yet been fully
implemented. Part II discusses the historical treatment of
marital rape and the rationales that exempted husbands from
criminal charges for rape of their wives. This Part also explores
the relationship between the historical justifications provided for
the toleration of marital rape and of domestic violence by the
criminal justice system. In Part III, I examine the current
treatment of partner rape in the criminal law, and in Part IV, I
consider how the legacy of the justifications for partner rape
continue to influence the current laws and policies in both
I conclude that the
partner rape and domestic violence.
progress in partner
obstructed
have
that
rationales
historical
rape reform also continue to impede our ability to fully address
domestic violence. To move forward in the fight to achieve justice
for battered women, we must look backward, and confront the
centuries-old rationales that still inform our policies and
practices.
I. THE SOUND OF SILENCE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY IN THE

540

ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 24:3

NOT-TOO-DISTANT PAST
A. Queens, New York, 1990s
It is a truism to say that we are all shaped by the experiences
we have lived. When speaking to students and younger people
about the need for aggressive enforcement of domestic violence
criminal justice policy, I fear it can be difficult for them to
understand the situation as it existed only twenty years ago,
because there has been such progress since that time. We have
already seen how the Gonzales case exemplifies the horrific
consequences that can come from a continuation of nonintervention policies. Unfortunately, I do not have to go so far
afield to feel the pain of those consequences. In the mid-1990s,
while practicing as a criminal defense lawyer, I worked on a
domestic violence case in Queens, not too far from the campus of
St. John's University. I want to share some of the issues that
stood out to me in that case, to try to convey what I believe could
be the devastating result if we were to back away from policies
that require law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges to treat
domestic violence seriously.
The client in my case was a housewife and part-time
bookkeeper in her mid-thirties, who had been married for several
years and had two young sons. She was also a battered woman
who had been subjected to severe physical, sexual, and
psychological abuse by her husband for most of their marriage,
starting when she was pregnant with their first child. The
violence escalated over the years, and by the end, her husband
carried a gun at all times when he was at home. He threatened
her with it and actually shot at her shortly before the incident
that led to this case. He was a hunter, who had the dead animals
he had killed stuffed and displayed around their home. He would
tell her that she would be next.
Her husband forced sex on her multiple times, and at a certain
point in their marriage, she never had consensual sex with him
again. Though she would resist at times, most of the time she
was too fearful. At times her husband had the gun on her during
these episodes. He got her pregnant during one of the rapes, but
she miscarried after he pushed her down a flight of stairs.
Though at times she told him that she wanted to leave and get a
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divorce, he told her that she would never take his two sons away
and live.
She worked with her family day after day, and though they
saw bruises and saw her fear of making him angry, they never
said anything to her or anyone else. When she miscarried, she
told her doctor that she had fallen down the stairs. Later, when
we obtained the doctor's notes, we saw that he had written on
that day, "Fallen? Pushed?," so the doctor clearly suspected
something but did not ask her or tell anyone.
Once during a violent episode, my client called the police, but
when they arrived her husband answered the door, and the
officers did not attempt to speak with her privately. They did not
arrest him, and no-one offered her any services. During another
incident, she tried to call 911, but her husband pulled the phone
out of the wall. She didn't try to reach the police again. Early
one morning, after a long night of abuse, her husband started
once again to try to force sex on her. In a moment, she grabbed
his gun, which he kept on the bedside table, and shot him once,
killing him. She was charged with intentional murder.
The Queens District Attorney's Office at that time had no
specialized domestic violence bureau, and the prosecutor
assigned to the case had no expertise in this area. From the start,
the D.A.'s office painted my client as a villainous and coldblooded murderer and failed to acknowledge the long history of
domestic violence to which she had been subjected. The D.A.
would not consider a plea to a lower charge, and we went to trial.
We asserted a defense of self-defense, and sought to introduce
testimony from an expert on the dynamics of battering to explain
why my client was acting reasonably when she feared she was in
imminent danger from her husband that day. Though this was
not a psychiatric defense, the judge, also untrained in domestic
violence, treated this offer of testimony as a claim of mental
illness, and required my client to undergo examination by a
prosecution psychiatrist with the prosecutor present.12 It was
unsurprising when the prosecutor's psychiatrist concluded that
my client was a sociopath and liar.
The jury convicted my client of murder, and another judge
imposed almost the maximum sentence, something virtually
12 People v. Rossakis, 605 N.Y.S.2d 825, 828 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).
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unheard of given her background.13 The judge announced that
she was worse than a mafia killer, because she had killed the
father of her children. When he made this statement, the judge
knew that her husband had abused her sons, though he had not
allowed this evidence to be admitted at the trial.14 Although
these statements were enraging, ultimately they proved to be
beneficial when the appellate court took the unusual step of
overturning the trial judge's sentence even though it was within
the discretionary range.15 Instead, the appellate court imposed
the minimum sentence allowed, though this was still fifteen
years to life.16 I still can hear her voice when she was in prison
telling me that though she hated to be away from her children,
jail was a relief after her marriage, "because at least [she] felt
safe."
There is a lot of failure to go around in this case. Her family,
the community, and, of course, I failed my client. But our
criminal justice system failed her, perhaps, most of all. The
police response, the prosecutor, and the court's treatment of the
case, all reveal a system that was not addressing domestic
violence adequately or intelligently. This case is not ancient
history. The incident occurred in 1993 and her trial and appeal
took place over the course of the mid-1990s.17
But a lot has changed since then. In 1994, New York passed a
mandatory arrest law in domestic violence cases, 18 and police
13 Women who kill their batterers generally receive longer sentences than men who
kill intimates.
See Developments in the Law - Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1574 n.3 (1993) (citing estimates that women who kill an intimate
partner on average receive sentences of fifteen to twenty years, while men who kill an
intimate partner on average receive sentences of two to six years); see also Wendy Keller,
DisparateTreatment of Spouse Murder Defendants, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
255, 284 n.3 (1996) (citing same statistics); see also ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED
WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 280-81 nn. 114-115 (2000) (citing one survey finding
that 83.7% of battered women convicted of homicide received sentences ranging from 25
years to life).
14 Despite her murder conviction, the Family Court awarded her legal custody of her
children when her husband's parents brought a suit for custody.
15 People v. Rossakis, 681 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1998) (terming the
sentence "excessive" and reducing it "as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice").
16 Id.
17 In 1993, the same year that the incident I describe occurred, Manhattan Borough
President Ruth Messinger issued a report that criticized the New York City justice
system's response to domestic violence and claimed that it placed battered women in
greater danger. See Miccio, supra note 3, at 408 n.5.
18 Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act of 1994, N .Y. Crim. Pro.
Law § 140.10 (2010).
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have changed their procedures, so that they now separate the
parties and interview them privately to try to ascertain what
happened.19 The police have specialized domestic violence officers
in each precinct who follow up with the victims after domestic
violence calls. 20 There now is a Family Justice Center in Queens
that offers victims of domestic violence a range of services,
2
including housing assistance, safety planning and counseling. 1 If
these laws, procedures and services had been in place in the
1980s and early 1990s, perhaps the domestic violence suffered by
my client could have been addressed, and her story would not
have ended in tragedy. The Queens D.A.'s office now has a
specialized domestic violence prosecution bureau, with attorneys
trained and experienced in these cases, and Queens now has
specialized courts with judges trained to preside over domestic
violence cases. 2 2 Of course, this doesn't mean that domestic
violence has been effectively prevented, or that every victim has
19 See New York Police Department, Domestic Violence: What You Need to Know: How
at
available
Help,
Can
Police
the
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/crime-prevention/domesticviolence.shtml. The police
department pamphlet for domestic violence victims explains the protocol when police
arrive on scene: "In order to assist you and your family, the police must interview you,
your abuser, and others who may have seen or heard the incident. When possible, you will
be asked questions apart from the abuser. This is done so that you can speak freely about
the incident without intimidation." Id. The pamphlet also explains that the police will
prepare a Domestic Incident Report, and victims will be given a copy. Id.
20 See id. The pamphlet for domestic violence victims, which is available in several
different languages, describes things police can do to help, including assistance in moving
to a shelter, obtaining and serving a protection order, getting medical care and social
services, lock change, and speaking to a Domestic Violence Prevention Officer.
21 Press Release, City of New York, Office of the Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg, Queens
District Attorney Brown and Domestic Violence Commissioner Jimenez Celebrate the
Opening of New York City's Second Family Justice Center (July 15, 2008), available at
httpJ/www.nyc.gov/test/ocdv/
downloads/pdf/QFJCOpeningPR.pdf (announcing the opening of a Family Justice
Center in Queens, which will bring together dedicated domestic violence prosecutors, civil
attorneys and social services providers under one roof to assist domestic violence victims
and their children).
Office,
District Attorney's
Queens
Bureau,
Violence
Domestic
22 See
http://www.queensda.org/
domesticviolence.html. The Queens D.A.'s office established a Domestic Violence Bureau
in 2000, and Queens County now has a specialized Domestic Violence Part to hear
domestic violence misdemeanors, and an Integrated Domestic Violence Court which hears
criminal domestic violence cases and related family issues. See Mayor's Office to Combat
(describing
www.nyc.gov/html/ocdv/html/services/courts.shtml
Domestic Violence,
Queens Criminal Court Domestic Violence Part); see also Center for Court Innovation,
Courts,
Violence
Domestic
Integrated
4
http://www.courtinnovation.orglindex.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&PagelD=60 &curr
entTopTier2=true (describing Integrated Domestic Violence Courts and noting operation
of Queens Integrated Domestic Violence Court).
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been treated sensitively, or that all domestic violence homicides
have been stopped. 2 3 The current state of affairs is far from
ideal, but it is well ahead of where we were less than twenty
years ago.
Do we want to return to the bad, but not so old days, of my
client's case? For me, this exemplifies why we must work to
ensure that these laws and policies are enforced more effectively,
while also learning from our mistakes and addressing all of the
needs of battered women. As the following sections in this
Article explain, I focus on one particular component of my client's
case to argue for increased enforcement of domestic violence
reforms - intimate partner rape.

B. The Connection Between Battering and Intimate PartnerRape
a. Intimate Partner Rape in the Queens Case
The role of marital rape in my client's case demonstrates in
several ways its function in a battering relationship, and the part
it has played in the law's treatment of domestic violence. It was
central to the abuse that my client's husband inflicted on her. It
was a method of choice for him because as he told her, the
physical bruises he caused through forced sex were on parts of
her body that the public did not see, and so others would be less
likely to be aware of his violence. The sex was also something he
felt she owed to him as his wife, a belief with deep roots in our
legal history. 24
23 However, intimate partner homicides in New York City increased 9.5% from 2007
to 2008, and increased 24.7% in New York State as a whole. MATTHEW FETZER & ADRIANA
FERNANDEZ-LANIER, DOMESTIC HOMICIDE IN NEW YORK STATE, 2008, 93 (2009). Forty-six

of the 523 homicides that took place in New York City in 2008, or 8.8%, were intimate
partner homicides. Id. at Table 2, at 3. Thirty of those intimate partner homicide victims
were women, while sixteen were male. Id. at 3. There were only sixty-five female victims
of all homicides in New York City in 2008, so that almost half (46.2%) of all female
homicide victims were victims of intimate partner homicide. In contrast, only 16 out of
429, or 3.7% of all male homicide victims were victims of intimate partner homicide. Id.
However, in New York City, the number female victims in intimate partner homicides
decreased by four (from thirty-four to thirty) and the number of male victims doubled
(from eight to sixteen) from 2007 to 2008. Id. at 11.
24 In one study of battered women who had been sexually assaulted by their partners,
over 85% of the women reported that their husbands held traditional beliefs about a
husband's ongoing right to have sex with his wife at any time. Jacquelyn C. Campbell &
Peggy Alford, The Dark Consequences of Marital Rape, 89 AM. J. NURSING 946, 947 (1989)
(stating 87.4% of respondents reported that their husbands believed in husband's right to
have sex with wife whenever he wants it).
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The actual episodes of rape were very violent, which contrary
to popular belief, is frequent in intimate partner rape. And the
humiliation and betrayal that she felt was a very typical reaction
by women to rape by someone they know. Despite commonly
held views, the psychological reactions of victims of intimate
partner rape can be far more severe than the response of those
who have suffered from rape by a stranger, because in addition to
all the other horrors, there is the sense of betrayal and
destruction of any trust that once existed.
Further, I am convinced that the fact that much of the abuse in
my client's case was sexual was an important factor in her
conviction. Despite the frequency with which marital rape
occurs, it remains difficult to persuade juries that marital rape is
"real rape," that it was an act of violence, or that the victim is
telling the truth. This is true in prosecutions of marital rape,
and I believe it was true when such acts were part of the
background that contributed to my client's defense of selfdefense. The cause of this complex of misperceptions can be
traced to the way that marital rape has been treated in the
Anglo-American legal system.
Though we do not always think of sexual assault as a part of a
battering relationship, as my client's case typifies, it can be a
significant component of domestic violence. Understanding the
dynamics, the consequences and the legal history of intimate
partner rape can be critical to comprehending the treatment of
domestic violence in our law and practice.
b. The Overlap of Battering and Rape
Rape and domestic violence traditionally have been
conceptualized as separate forms of violence against women.
While rape involves sexual violence, research and policy on
domestic abuse has focused on non-sexual physical aggression,
such as assaults or threats of violence. 25 Though criticism of the
25 See Jacquelyn C. Campbell & Karen L. Soeken, Forced Sex and Intimate Partner
Violence: Effects on Women's Risk and Women's Health, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
1017, 1018 (1999) (noting historically sexual assault was seldom considered as separate
phenomenon of battering, and that forced relationship sex was a separate and important
type of violence against women); see Raquel Kennedy Bergen, Marital Rape: New
Research and Directions, National Online Resource Center on Violence Against Women
(2006), http://new.vawnet.orgcategory/MainDoc.php?docid=248 (explaining historically
many battered women's shelters and rape crisis centers failed to address the problem of
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contemporary legal treatment of both rape and domestic violence
began to flourish in the 1970s, there was little discussion in
26
either field of intimate partner rape.

In reality, however, the two forms of violence are intertwined.
First, a significant percentage of rapes are perpetrated by an
intimate partner of the victim. Though we tend to picture a
rapist as a stranger on a dark street, data show that a majority of
sexual assault victims know their assailants. 2 7 Further, many of
these non-stranger rapes are perpetrated by current or former
intimate partners. 28 One of the most recent comprehensive
surveys of violence against women concluded that 7.7% of all
women will be raped by their current or former partners at some
This study concluded that
time during their lifetimes. 29
marital rape).
26 Martin D. Schwartz, The Spousal Exemption for CriminalRape Prosecution,7 VT.
L. REV. 33, 34 (1982); Morgan Lee Woolley, Note, Marital Rape: A Unique Blend of
Domestic Violence and Non-Marital Rape Issues, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 269, 270,
274-78 (2007) (arguing that neither domestic violence nor stranger rape policies
adequately address marital rape).
27
According to data from the National Crime Victimization Survey, 54% of all rapes
in 2006 were committed by someone well known to or a casual acquaintance of the victim,
as compared to 34% committed by strangers. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF
JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2006 STATISTICAL TABLES, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY,

TABLE 34, (2006), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/contentfpub/
pdf/cvus06.pdf [hereinafter Table 34]. A 1992 study found that only 22% of forcible rapes
and sexual assaults were committed by strangers. NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER & CRIME
VICTIMS RESEARCH AND TRAINING CENTER, RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 4
(1992) [hereinafter RAPE IN AMERICA]. Local rape crisis centers report even higher
proportions of non-stranger rapes. Massachusetts and Minnesota rape crisis center data
from the mid-1980s report that over 80% of all rapes reported are perpetrated by nonstrangers See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading About Rape: A Primer, 66 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 979, 985, 986 n.12 (1993). The stereotype that rape involves a stranger
perpetrator, use of a weapon and/or physical violence, and results in signs of physical
injury is false. In reality, in most sexual assaults the perpetrator is known to the victim,
weapons or physical violence are not used and there is no sign of physical injury. See
Kimberly A. Lonsway, Joanne Archambault & David Lisak, False Reports: Moving Beyond
the Issue to Successfully Investigate and Prosecute Non-stranger Sexual Assault, THE
VOICE, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2009 at 1, 3-4.
28 Of the 54% of rapes committed by non-strangers, more than half were perpetrated
by someone well known to the victim. TABLE 34, supra note 27. The category "Wellknown" does not break down the data into different types of close relationships. Id. The
1992 study found that 9% of all rapes were committed by husbands and ex-husbands, 10%
by boyfriends or ex-boyfriends, 11% by fathers or step-fathers, 16% by other relatives,
29% by non-relatives such as friends or neighbors. RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 27, at 4.
In the remaining 3% of rapes reported, the respondents were either unsure or refused to
answer. Id.
29 See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES
OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN SURVEY 9 (2000), availableat httpJ/www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/181867.pdf. For

the National

Violence Against

Women Survey, researchers

conducted telephone
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approximately half of all victims of intimate partner rape were
raped multiple times by the same partner; of those women
victimized more than once by the same partner, the average was
4.5 rapes. 3 0 62.6% of those women victimized more than once
31
said that the victimization lasted one year or more.

In addition, a substantial percentage of perpetrators who
physically batter their intimate partners also sexually assault
them. While not all intimate partner rape is accompanied by
other types of violence, it is clear that there is significant overlap
between sexual assault and additional forms of domestic
violence. 32 Several studies indicate that in approximately 40 to

45% of battering relationships, the perpetrator sexually assaults
or forces sex upon his partner. 33 In one study involving battered

women who were sexually assaulted by their partners, the
women reported a variety of types of forced sex, including vaginal

intercourse (82.7%), anal intercourse (52.8%), being hit, kicked,
or burned during sex (44.1%), and having objects inserted in the
vagina and anus (28.6%).34 Some of the women reported being

forced into acts of extreme degradation, including sex with
animals, and involvement of their children in various sexual
acts. 35 Almost half of the women (49.6%) had been threatened
with physical violence for refusing sex, more than one third
(36.7%) had been beaten for refusing sex, and 50.9% had been
36
forced to have sex immediately after having been beaten.

interviews with a nationally representative sample of 8,000 U.S. women and 8,000 U.S.
men about their experience as victims of various types of violence, including intimate
partner violence. Id. at 13. See also DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 1-2 (1990).
Russell conducted interviews with 930 women, and found that 84 of the 644 (or 13%) who
had ever been married were victims of rape or attempted rape by their husbands. Id.
30 TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 29, at 39.
31 Id.
32 See Bergen, supra note 25, at 1 (stating women in physically abusive relationships
may be especially vulnerable to rape by their partners); Sarah M. Harless, Note, From the
Bedroom to the Courtroom: The Impact of Domestic Violence Law on Marital Rape
Victims, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 305, 308 (2003).
33 JACQUELYN C. CAMPBELL & DAVID BOYD, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: SYNTHESIS
OF RESEARCH FOR HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS 5 (2000) (citing studies). See Bergen
supra note 25 (noting studies have found that there are some women who are raped by
their husbands, but not otherwise battered).
34 Campbell & Alford, supra note 24, at 947. The research sample came from 115
questionnaires completed by women who were incoming residents of domestic violence
shelters throughout the state of Michigan, and who reported that they had been sexually
abused. Id. at 946-947.
35 Id. at 947.
36 Id. at 947- 48.
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There is also evidence that batterers who rape their partners
may be among the most dangerous perpetrators of domestic
violence. Battered women who are also sexually assaulted by
their partners have physical health effects beyond those caused
by physical and emotional abuse. 37 And victims of domestic
violence who are also the victims of intimate partner rape are
subject to more serious physical abuse and at greater risk of
homicide. 3 8
Clearly then, intimate partner rape is a form of domestic
violence that deserves serious attention. Its significant coexistence with other forms of intimate partner violence also
makes it an important topic for understanding and addressing
domestic violence generally.
C. Intimate PartnerRape As Allegory
There are many aspects of my client's case on which I could
draw to argue that the recent reforms in law and policy have
been critical to our progress in achieving an effective domestic
violence response. I am choosing to focus on intimate partner
rape, however, because changes in this area have lagged far
behind those in domestic violence generally. Where intimate
partner rape is concerned, the bad old days are surely still with
us. Therefore, for those who have not experienced the traditional
handling of domestic violence by the criminal justice system,
intimate partner rape provides a current and stark example of
ineffective, uneducated and unjust treatment of violence against
women in our laws and policies. In this way, it can help to
demonstrate why we cannot return to a domestic violence policy
that fails to require serious treatment by the criminal justice
system.
But the story of intimate partner rape serves as more than just
a warning about the failures of past treatment of domestic
violence. It also may help us to understand some of the ongoing
37 Campbell & Soeken, supra note 25, at 1030-31, 1032.
38 CAMPBELL & BOYD, supra note 33, at 2; Campbell & Soeken, supra note 25, at
1028 (describing researching findings that battered women who were also sexually
assaulted by their batterers were at significantly higher risk for homicide than battered
women not sexually assaulted). See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 45 (noting that rape crisis
center staff "often argue that marital rapes are characterized by some of the most serious
physical abuse").
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barriers to achieving greater progress in the current treatment of
domestic violence. As explained in the following section, though
intimate partner rape has some separate historical justifications
and distinct harms, it is a form of domestic violence and shares
many of the traditional rationales for domestic violence
generally. Perhaps then the laws and practices of intimate
partner rape can help to reveal the causes of resistance to full
implementation of domestic violence policy that will mark justice
for battered women.
II. THE LEGAL HISTORY OF MARITAL RAPE

For most of our history, the law did not consider rape by a
husband of his wife a crime. 39 In fact, the phrasing of this
statement does not accurately characterize the historical view of
marital sexual relations, since at that time, one could not
conceive of any sexual act by a husband with his wife as a "rape."
Though we commonly refer to the "marital exemption" to rape,
historically the law would not consider a husband "exempt" from
prosecution; his behavior simply was not recognized by the law
as potentially criminal. It is only in the modern era that the law
began to contemplate that such acts by a husband could be
recognized within the criminal law, and to consider his removal
from that law an exception. What we now term the "marital
exemption" to rape shares some historical roots with our law's
traditional recognition of the right of a husband to use physical
violence against his wife, though it also was supported by some
additional justifications particular to rape.
A. Coverture and PropertyRights
Both the marital exemption to rape and the historical right of a
husband to "chastise" his wife4 0 were justified by the law of
coverture, adopted in this country from English law.
At
marriage, a woman's legal identity was merged into that of her
husband. As William Blackstone stated, "By marriage, the
39 Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal
Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IowA L. REV. 1253, 1261 & 1262 n. 29 (2009) (citing 19th
century legal treatises stating that a husband could not be convicted of raping his wife).
40 Reva B. Siegel, 'The Rule of Love': Wife Beating as Prerogativeand Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2122-23 (1996).
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husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage,
or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband." 4 1 A married woman could not own or transfer
property, sue or be sued, or enter into contracts. 42
Further, a husband was responsible for any legal obligations
undertaken by his wife. This responsibility provided the basis for
legal recognition of domestic violence. Because the husband
carried the burden of his wife's conduct and any misconduct, the
law held that he had the right to "correct" her behavior, including
physical discipline if necessary. 43 The husband thus had the
right to use physical violence against his wife, as a master did
against a servant or a father against a child.44
In addition to the justification for domestic violence, coverture
created a specific rationale for the marital rape exemption,
because if a husband and wife were one legal entity, a man could
not be charged with raping himself.45 Further, because a
married woman had no autonomous legal existence, she was
considered the property of her husband. 46
Rape was
conceptualized not as a crime of violence, but as a property crime.
Committed against a single woman, it violated the property
interest of the woman's father, and the rape of a married woman
was a violation of the property rights of her husband. 4 7 A
husband could not legally rape his wife, because he could not be
48
convicted of "stealing" or causing harm to his own property.
41 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 442 (1765).
42 Jill Elaine Hasday, Protecting Them From Themselves: The Persistence of Mutual
Benefits Arguments for Sex and Race Equality, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1464, 1497 (2009)
[hereinafter "ProtectingThem From Themselves"]; SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 13-14.
43 BLACKSTONE, supra note 41, at 432 ("The husband also (by the old law) might give
his wife moderate correction. For, as he is to answer for her misbehavior, the law thought
it reasonable to entrust him with this power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement,
in the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his servants or children.").
44 Id.

45 Sandra L. Ryder & Sheryl A. Kuzmenka, Legal Rape: The MaritalRape Exemption,
24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 393, 400 (1991) (discussing how rape laws originated from the
premise that male property rights were being violated).
46 Rebecca M. Ryan, The Sex Right: A Legal History of the MaritalRape Exemption,
20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 941,944 (1995).
47 See People v. Liberta, 474 N.E. 2d 567, 576 (N.Y. 1984) (noting historically rape
laws were designed to "protect the chastity of women and thus their property value to
their fathers or husbands").
48 See Woolley, supra note 26, at 275-76 (discussing how wives were considered
chattel of their husbands); see also Katherine M. Schelong, Domestic Violence and the
State: Responses to and Rationales for Spousal Battering,Marital Rape & Stalking, 78
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B. ProtectingMaritalPrivacy and Harmony
The law of coverture continued to provide justification both for
domestic violence and the marital rape exemption until well into
the 19th century. However, the system of coverture began to be
dismantled with the passage of the Married Women's Property
Acts, which gave married women the right to own property and
incur personal legal obligations. 49 The first Married Women's
Property Act was enacted in Mississippi in 1839 and, within fifty
years, every state had adopted some form of such an act. 50
Though coverture could no longer provide legal justification for
domestic violence, a new rationale for such violence emerged.
The preservation of marital privacy and domestic harmony
required that the law remain uninvolved in the relationship
between husband and wife. 51 Though domestic violence may not
be officially approved, it would be tolerated by the legal system,
so as not to invade the privacy of the family. Further, by staying
out of private marital relations, the law would promote
reconciliation and restoration of harmony. As one court put it: "If
no permanent injury has been inflicted, nor malice, cruelty nor
dangerous violence shown by the husband, it is better to draw
the curtain, shut out the public gaze, and leave the parties to
52
forget and forgive."
The rationale of preserving marital privacy and harmony to
condone physical violence also was used to maintain the marital
exemption for rape. 53 If the general relationship between
MARQ. L. REV. 79, 87 (1994) (explaining rape laws were intended to protect property
interests of men).
49 See Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1257 n.16 (1986)(these Acts began to alter the
traditional status of married women by granting them such rights as the right to contract,
to sue and be sued, and to retain their own earnings).
50 Id.
51 See Siegel, supra note 40, at 2168-69 (noting public inquiries into marriages were
thought to be too disruptive to the private life of the couple).
52 State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61-62 (1874). See State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 457
(1868) ("However great are the evils of ill temper, quarrels, and even personal conflicts
inflicting only temporary pain, they are not comparable with the evils which would result
from raising the curtain, and exposing to public curiosity and criticism, the nursery and
the bed chamber.").
53 See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88
CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1486-87 (2000) (positing modern defense of the marital rape exemption
focuses on the need to protect the privacy of the spousal relationship from judicial
intervention and to promote reconciliation) thereinafter Hasday, Contest and Consent];
Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 49, at 1257-58, 1268-69 (describing development
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husband and wife was private, then their sexual relations were
certainly even more intimate, and should remain protected from
legal intervention. Further, the law's involvement would prevent
54
the spouses from reconciling and restoring marital harmony.
The justification of protecting marital privacy shaped and
perpetuated criminal laws and policies of non-intervention inth
both domestic violence and marital rape through the late 20
century. Through the 1970s, police officers were instructed to
treat incidents of domestic violence as non-criminal matters,
rather than arrest perpetrators. 55 Most frequently, police would
separate the parties and tell the husband to cool off and take a
walk around the block.56
The argument that marital rape should not be criminalized
because it would prevent reconciliation of the spouses also
continued through the modern era, despite its obvious
weaknesses. 5 7 For example, in a 1981 case, the Supreme Court of
Colorado upheld the constitutionality of a marital rape exception,
finding that it "may remove a substantial obstacle to the
resumption of normal marital relations," and "encourag[e] the
preservation of family relationships." 58 The Court further stated
that the marital exception avoids prying into private marital
relations: "[o]therwise juries would be expected to fathom the
intimate sexual feelings, frustrations, habits and understandings
of modern privacy rationales for marital exemption, which included fostering marital
harmony and encouraging spousal reconciliation). See Schwartz , supra note 26, at 34-35
(noting the "Hydra-like existence" of the marital exemption, "as each argument is refuted
by scholars, another one, equally spurious, rises to take its place.").
54 Hasday, Contest and Consent, supra note, at 1487 (noting that the marital privacy
argument assumes that the rape exemption protects the interests of both husband and
wife, and that marriage is "a necessarily harmonious relation, and legal intervention [is]
the first, unwelcome introduction of antagonism and injury"); see also Protecting Them
From Themselves, supra note 42, at 1472-74 (citing arguments by defenders of the marital
rape exemption that its abandonment would violate the privacy of both husbands and
wives by government invasion of the marital bedroom).
55 Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46,47 (1992) (explaining police policy regarded domestic violence
as aprvate matter).
56 Id. at 47-48 .
57 See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 46-47 (noting that this argument presumes that
sexual violence by husbands is a trivial marital issue to be "ironed out" and that such
violence does not merit attention by the criminal law); see also Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 574
("The marital rape exemption simply does not further marital privacy because this right
of privacy protects consensual acts, not violent assaults."); Weishaupt v. Commonwealth,
315 S.E.2d 847 (Va. 1984) (noting that if marriage has already deteriorated to the point of
rape, "we doubt that there is anything left to reconcile.").
58 People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981).
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unique to particular marital relationships." 59 For far longer than
it affirmatively condoned domestic violence, the law continued to
justify non-intervention in marital rape cases in order to protect
marital privacy and harmony. The first case holding the marital
exemption unconstitutional was not decided until 1984,60 and it
was not until 1993 that every state had eliminated the full
marital exemption. 61 Further, as discussed below, while domestic
violence now is clearly against the law in every state, marital
rape continues to be partially exempted from prosecution and
treated differently in the law of many states. 6 2
The preservation of privacy and promotion of reconciliation
remained a justification for the marital rape exemption.
However, defenders of the exemption also relied on an additional
justification not overtly utilized to condone domestic violence the consent of the victim.
C. Consent to Rape
Unlike domestic violence, or other crimes of violence, rape
traditionally requires proof that the victim did not consent to the
act. Therefore, a justification for the marital rape exemption was
that the victim had in fact consented to have sexual relations.
The wife's consent, however, did not have to be proven in each act
of sex. Rather, this consent to sexual relations with her husband
was ongoing and implied by her marital vows.
This argument is thought to have originated in a treatise by
Lord Matthew Hale, a Chief Justice of England in the 17th
century: "The husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by
himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial
consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind
unto her husband, which she cannot retract."6 3 According to this
59 Id.
60 Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984).
61 See Bergen, supra note 25. North Carolina was the last state to repeal its full
marital rape exemption in 1993. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (2005);see Lynn Hecht
Schafran, Stefanie Lopez-Boy, & Mary Rothwell Davis, Making MaritalRape a Crime: A
Long Road Travelled, A Long Way to Go, in CONNECTIONS: A BIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF
THE WASHINGTON COALITION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT PROGRAMS, Vol. X, No. 1, 15, 21
(Summer 2008).
62 See infra text accompanying notes 67-75.
63

1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (Sollom

Emlyn ed., 1st Am. ed. 1778). Lord Hale's argument was accepted into American law. See
Commonwealth v. Fogarty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489, 490 (1857) (citing Hale in dictum in
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theory, through marriage, a wife has agreed to sexual intercourse
with her husband at any time and under all circumstances. As
many modern commentators and courts have noted, Judge Hale
provided no precedent for his "ongoing consent" theory. 64
However, it was readily accepted into the common law, and has
65
had remarkable staying power.

While the formal law of coverture was abandoned, and the
status of married women in other areas changed dramatically,
courts in the modern era continued to rely on this conception of
the "wifely duty," together with the marital privacy argument to
uphold the marital rape exemption. To the extent that they
offered any justification at all, courts typically cited to Hale or
simply stated that the exemption was settled law. 66
III. THE CURRENT LEGAL TREATMENT OF MARITAL RAPE
The elimination of the full marital rape exemption by court
decision and legislation began in the 1980s, and by the early

1990s, the full exemption did not exist in any state. However,
almost half of all states continue to differentiate between marital
and stranger rape in a variety of ways, such as imposing
heightened procedural requirements for marital rape, requiring
additional elements of proof, continuing a marital exemption for
certain forms of rape, and authorizing lower sentences for
marital rape convictions. 6 7

recognition of the marital exemption to rape).
64 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 196, 426 A.2d 38, 41-42 (1981) (terming Lord
Hale's statement a "bare, extra-judicial declaration" which "cannot itself be considered a
definitive and binding statement of the common law"); State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903, 904
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that Hale's statement, "which stands alone, naked of
citation to any authority, judicial or otherwise, could be considered sufficient precedent to
allow a husband to rape with impunity his wife baffles all sense of logic."). See Warren v.
State, 255 Ga. 151, 155, 336 S.E.2d 221, 224-25 (1985) (the state would not add "an
implied consent term to all marriage contracts that would leave all wives no protection
under the law from the 'ultimate violation of the self . . . simply because they choose to
enter into a relationship that is respected and protected by law.") (citation omitted).
65 See Smith, 426 A.2d at 41-42 (noting that courts and commentators have continued
to rely on Lord Hale's theory "without evaluating its merits"); Schwartz, supra note 26, at
36 (noting the continuing influence of Lord Hale's argument despite vast changes in
married women's rights).
66 See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 42 & n.62; People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 163,
474 N.E.2d 567, 572 (1984) (late nineteenth-century courts usually relied solely on Hale
in adopting the exemption).
67 Professor Jill Hasday notes that currently at least twenty-four states continue to
treat marital rape differently in some regard. Protecting Them From Themselves, supra
note 42, at 1471.
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A. Current Statutes
Without attempting to be comprehensive, the following
examples provide a flavor of the different treatment that marital
rape currently receives under the law. Until very recently,
several states narrowed the time that a victim had to report a
marital rape in order for it to be prosecutable. 6 8 South Carolina
still maintains distinct reporting requirements for spousal rape,
mandating that it be reported within thirty days. 6 9 Some state
laws prevent prosecution of a spouse for certain forms of rape.
For example, in Maryland, a spouse cannot be charged with first
or second degree rape-the two most serious charges of sexual
assault-unless the parties are separated or other requirements
are satisfied. 70 In Ohio, Kentucky, and New Hampshire, while
generally perpetrators may be prosecuted for rape where the
victim is not mentally competent or able to consent, a spouse is
exempt from prosecution in such situations. 7 1 Rhode Island also
exempts spouses from first degree sexual assault charges when
they know or have reason to know that the victim is "mentally

68 For example, Illinois and California both had shortened reporting requirements for
spousal rape until 2004 and 2007, respectively. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-18 (1961),
amended by 2003 ILL. H.B. 4771 (effective Aug. 20, 2004); CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (1979),
amended by 2006 CAL S.B. 1402 (effective Jan. 1, 2007).
69 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-615 (2008).
70 See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-318 (West 2009). Maryland law exempts
spouses from first and second degree rape, as well as sexual offense in the third and
fourth degrees, unless the parties have a written separation agreement or have been
separated for at least three months immediately prior to the incident, or have a decree of
limited divorce, or the perpetrator uses force or threat or force and the act is without the
consent of the spouse.
71 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2009) ("No person shall engage
in sexual conduct with another who is not the spouse of the offender or who is the spouse
of the offender but is living separate and apart from the offender, when . .. [flor the
purpose of preventing resistance, the offender substantially impairs the other person's
judgment or control by administering any drug... surreptitiously or by force .. ." or the
other person is less than thirteen, or whose ability to resist or consent is substantially
impaired because of a mental or physical condition.). See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.035
(West 2009) ("A person who engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse
with another person to whom the person is married, or subjects another person to whom
the person is married to sexual contact, does not commit an offense under this chapter
regardless of the person's age solely because the other person is less than sixteen (16)
years old or mentally retarded."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2 (excepting legally
marital spouses when victim is "mentally defective and the actor knows or has reason to
know that the victim is mentally defective" or when victim is a minor over the age of 13).
See also OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111 (2009) (stating in Oklahoma, spouse is exempt where
victim "isincapable through mental illness or any other unsoundness of mind.., of giving
legal consent" unless force or violence is used or threatened.).
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72
incapacitated, mentally disabled, or physically helpless."
Some states require proof of additional elements in marital
rape prosecutions. For example, while many states have modified
or eliminated certain legal requirements for rape in the past 30
years, such as proof of force or resistance, some jurisdictions have
kept these elements intact for marital rape. In Oklahoma, for
example, spousal rape requires use or threat of force or
violence. 73 Similarly, in Idaho, a spouse can be convicted of rape
only if the victim resists and her resistance is overcome by force,
or she is prevented from resisting due to threat of bodily harm or
74
because of a narcotic or anesthetic.

Some jurisdictions provide for lower sentences in marital rape
cases. In Virginia, both non-marital and marital rape is subject
to a sentence ranging from five years to life imprisonment.
However, where the offender is the spouse of the victim, the
judge may suspend a guilty judgment and dismiss the charges if
the defendant successfully completes counseling while on
probation.

75

The continued disparity in the treatment of marital rape has
important symbolic value, for it indicates that the law continues
to view rape by an intimate partner as less serious and less of a
crime than stranger rape. Just as criminalizing conduct sends a
message to both would-be perpetrators and the community at
large that certain behavior is unacceptable, failure to criminalize
certain conduct makes clear that it is tolerated. 7 6 Under our
72 R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-2 (1) (2009).
73 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 1111 (2009) ("Rape is an act of sexual intercourse
accomplished with a male or female who is the spouse of the perpetrator if force or
violence is used or threatened, accompanied by apparent power of execution to the victim
or to another person."); see also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.373 (LexisNexis 2009) ("It is
no defense to a charge of sexual assault that the perpetrator was, at the time of the
assault, married to the victim, if the assault was committed by force or by the threat of
force.").
74 IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-6107; 18-6101 (2009).
75 VA.CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (2009). The statute states that the judge can do this only
where an offender has not previously had a case dismissed under this procedure, and
where the victim and the prosecutor consent. The charges may be dismissed "if, after
consideration of the views of the complaining witness and such other evidence as may be
relevant, the court finds such action will promote maintenanceof the family unit and be in
the best interest of the complaining witness." Id. § 18.2-61(C) (2009) (emphasis added). In
South Carolina, an offender can be sentenced for up to thirty years for non-marital rape,
but only for up to ten years for marital rape. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652 (2008); Id.
§ 16-3-615 (2008).
76 See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 50-51. The public is more likely to view conduct as
immoral if it is criminal. Id. Elimination of the marital rape exemption also makes a
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current laws, the message is that rape by an intimate continues
to be acceptable, at least under certain circumstances. And even
more fundamentally, the differential treatment of marital rape
demonstrates ongoing toleration for the view that married
women are not entitled to legal autonomy.77
Of course, the changes in marital rape laws that have occurred
to eliminate the full exemption provide some symbolic benefit.
However, even this benefit diminishes if the public perceives that
such laws are not enforced. Moreover, the harms caused by such
violence are not addressed if marital rape is not prosecuted. The
following section discusses how the ambivalence that has led to
only partial legal reform in this area, has also hindered effective
prosecution of marital and intimate partner rape cases.
B. Prosecutionof Intimate PartnerRape
The National Violence Against Women Survey found that less
than one-fifth (17.2%) of those women raped by an intimate
79
partner said that they reported the most recent rape to police.
Rape victims generally have been reluctant to report the crime to
police due to the criminal justice system's historically insensitive
treatment of these cases. This reluctance to report can only be
greater in the context of intimate partner rape, which continues
to be minimized by our system. As described above, in many
jurisdictions, the rape may not even be considered a crime at all,
which gives little incentive for the victim to report it.
But even when these rapes are criminalized in the formal law,
prosecution remains infrequent and conviction rates are low.
Ultimately, only about 7.5% of all intimate partner rapes are
79
prosecuted and, of those, 58.1% do not result in a conviction.
Prosecution of intimate partner rape has been only marginally
more effective since recent reforms in rape law were
implemented. One study which reviewed national data from the
1970s to 1990 found that though there was a slightly greater
statement about the rights of women in marriage. Id. at 51.
77 Bergen, supra note 25 (noting marital rape exceptions make it appear that
marriage creates an entitlement to sexual intercourse); Schelong, supra note 48, at 117
(arguing the continuation of this exemption perpetuates the idea that women are chattel
of men).
78 Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note 29, at 49.
79 Id. at 51-52.
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likelihood that offenders of non-stranger and stranger rapes
would be sanctioned similarly, there remained a large
"acquaintance discount" in the treatment of rape.8 0 Another
study analyzed data on acquaintance rape prosecutions in
Detroit before and after general reforms in rape law.S1 The
study's hypothesis was that the general reforms in rape law
might increase acquaintance rape prosecutions more than
prosecutions of stranger rape. However, though post-reform a
greater proportion of the acquaintance rape cases were bound
over for trial, there was "no support for [the] hypothesis that
simple rapes bound over for trial would be taken more seriously
in the post-reform period;" these cases were just as likely to be
dismissed, and they were no more likely to result in a conviction
or incarceration.
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It is likely that many prosecutors do not proceed in marital
rape cases, not because they do not take them seriously, but
because they believe that these cases will not result in
convictions.8 3 Some may argue that prosecutors nevertheless

should continue to try these cases. However, the belief that juries
are unlikely to convict may be largely accurate. Like the unequal
treatment of partner rape in legal statutes, the low prosecution

and conviction rates in these cases reflect a belief system that is
rooted in outmoded historical doctrines.
80 Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effects of
Rape Law Reform: How Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554,
568-74 (1993). See Schafran, supra note 27, at 1029-30 (citing reports from task forces on
gender bias in the courts which note that nonstranger rape may be "minimized and
trivialized" by actors in the court system, who may be more likely to doubt the judgment
and credibility of victims in these cases).
81 Cassia C. Spohn & Julia Homey, The Impact of Rape Law Reform on the
Processing of Simple and Aggravated Rape Cases, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 861,
863-84 (1996) [hereinafter Simple and Aggravated Rape]. The authors had previously
studied reforms in rape prosecution generally, and found that in five of six large
jurisdictions, these reforms had not resulted in a greater proportion of convictions. See
CASSIA SPOHN & JULIA HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS
IMPACT 77-105 (1992). Detroit was the one jurisdiction in which rape reform had had
some impact, and so they focused their analysis of the impact of reform on stranger vs.
acquaintance rapes there. Spohn & Homey, Simple and Aggravated Rape, supra, at 865.
2 Spohn & Homey, Simple andAggravated Rape, supra note 81, at 883.
83 See Lonsway, Archambault & Lisak, supra note 27, at 4. The authors argue that
prosecutors may subscribe to stereotypes about victims of sexual assaults, but even if they
do not believe them themselves, they know that the stereotypes "will be prominent in the
minds of judges and jurors as they make decisions regarding a sexual assault case". Id.
As the authors note, "Prosecutors may therefore believe that they cannot ethically charge
a defendant in cases that depart too much from the stereotype of 'real rape,' because a
jury would not be likely to convict." Id.
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IV. THE LEGACY OF HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MARITAL

RAPE

The different legal treatment, and the difficulties of
prosecuting marital rape reflect the continuing power of the
historical justifications provided for the marital exemption.
A. The Presumptionof Consent
The heightened force or resistance requirements for marital
rape in some state laws reveal the presumption of consent by a
wife to all sex within marriage. This presumption can be
removed only by proving a level of force or resistance that
generally is no longer a required element in stranger rape law.
The maintenance of the spousal exemption in cases where a
victim is legally incapable of giving consent due to age or mental
incapacity also reflects the presumption of consent in marital
rape.
The power of the "consent" theory in partner rape is also
apparent in an interesting development in rape law in the
When courts began to strike down marital
modern era.
exemptions on equal protection grounds, some state legislatures
responded, not by eliminating the marital exemption in their
statutes, but instead by expanding the exemption to include
unmarried couples who were living together or otherwise
sexually involved. 8 4 This expansion of the exemption also
reflected modern social mores that recognized the likelihood of
sex before marriage. The expansion manifests an outsized
84 See Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 49, at 1260 & nn. 37-38. This 1985
article cites several states which had recently expanded the exemption to cover unmarried
cohabitants and "voluntary social companions." Id. See also Schelong, supra note 48, at
107. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1) (1962). The Code bars a conviction for first
degree rape if the victim was the perpetrator's "voluntary social companion ... upon the
occasion of the crime" and had "previously permitted him sexual liberties." Id. The Model
Penal Code's rape statute exempts a husband from prosecution for all forms of rape of his
wife, and is also gender-specific: "A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his
wife is guilty of rape if.... ." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1962). Writing in 1982, Martin
Schwartz argued that "gains which have been made by reducing the marital rape
exemption have been counteracted by a move in some states to expand the marital rape
exemption to unmarried persons who had never before been considered exempt by law."
Schwartz, supra note 26, at 41. Schwartz also notes this expansion exists in the laws of
thirteen states. Id.
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version of the "ongoing consent" theory.
Now, a woman's
"ongoing consent" to sex was not limited to her husband.
Whenever she had consensual sex, she was providing permanent
consent to sex with that partner at any time. 85
Conversely, the influence of the "consent" theory is also clear in
statutes which differentiate married partners that are still living
together, from those that are separated. Several states define
"spouse" for purposes of the marital exemption as one who is
living together with his partner. In these statutes, once the
parties are formally separated or even just living apart, the
husband loses his "marital" status, even though formally he
remains married to his victim. 8 6 This distinction may indicate
that a husband living apart or separated from his spouse is not
entitled to the presumption of ongoing consent usually enjoyed in
marriage. 8

7

The presumption of consent is also clear from the belief
common among the public, including jurors, that the injury of
85 See Note, To Have and To Hold, supra note 49, at 1260. As Schwartz points out,
the expansion of the exemption to include non-marital partners cannot be justified by the
historical conception of marriage as subject to different treatment under the law. Rather,
by expanding the exemption to include non-marital intimate partners, legislators
demonstrated toleration of intimate partner violence; "[o]nly a legislative view that
accepts at least some domestic violence as proper and normal could lead to the current
move to decriminalization." Schwartz, supra note 26, at 57.
86 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432 (2009) (providing marital exemption for certain
forms of sexual assault if the perpetrator is "married to the person and neither party has
filed with the court for a separation, divorce, or dissolution of the marriage"); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2907.01 -- 2907.03 (LexisNexis 2009). (providing a marital exemption for
certain types of sexual assault, such as sexual battery, but a person married to the
offender at the time of the alleged offense is not defined as a "spouse" if the parties have
entered into a written separation agreement, there is a pending annulment, divorce or
legal separation proceeding, or the incident occurred after the effective date of the
judgment for a legal separation).See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(L); § 2907.03
(LexisNexis 2009) (exempting spouse from sexual battery charge). See also OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (A)(1) (2010) (noting offender is not exempted under the rape
statute if the alleged victim was the legal spouse, but was "living separate and apart from
the offender" when "[flor the purpose of preventing resistance, the offender substantially
impairs the other person's judgment or control by administering any drug . . .
surreptitiously or by force..." or the other person is less than thirteen, or whose ability to
resist or consent is substantially impaired because of a mental or physical condition). See
also MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-318 (West 2009).
87 See State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 42, 43 (1981). The Court noted that Lord Hale's
consent theory was developed in a period when marriages were "effectively permanent,
ending only by death or an act of Parliament," but that the rule need not apply when
marriage is not irrevocable and divorce is far easier to access. Id. "Ifa wife can exercise a
legal right to separate from her husband and eventually terminate the marriage
'contract,' may she not also revoke a 'term' of that contract, namely, consent to
intercourse?" Id. at 205, 426 A.2d at 44. Therefore, the consent theory did not apply
when the spouses, though still legally married, were living separately. Id. at 205- 07, 426
A.2d at 44-45.
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intimate partner rape must be less severe because the woman
88
previously has had consensual sex with the perpetrator.
However, substantial research demonstrates that this is a
misperception. In fact, the psychological injury from partner
rape can be far greater because the woman feels betrayed by this
act of violence from someone with whom she previously has been
Moreover, the physical injuries resulting from
intimate.8 9
Contrary to common
intimate partner rape can be severe.
perception, intimate partner rapes are not trivial bedroom

miscommunications, but acts of psychic and physical violence.
The damage and fear is further compounded by the victim's
continued contact with her attacker. 90 Moreover, victims of
intimate partner rape are themselves affected by the myths
surrounding non-stranger rape. They may experience greater
trauma because they may be more likely to feel guilt and shame,
to hide the rape, to blame themselves and be blamed by others,
and to believe themselves less deserving of help. 9 1
B. PreservingMarriage

The historical justification of protecting marital privacy and
promoting reconciliation continues to have power in modern day
rape prosecutions. As one prosecutor of spousal rape cases noted,

88 See Lisa R. Eskow, Note, The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal Rape
and Reconceptualizing its Prosecution,48 STAN. L. REV. 677, 701 (1996) (citing California
prosecutor who believes that jurors typically view spousal rape as inherently less severe
because "the relationship acts as mitigation"); Bergen, supra note 25 (citing 1996 study of
attitudes among college students which found that marital rape was perceived as less
serious than stranger rape and that only 50% of male students thought it was possible for
a husband to rape his wife). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 8(c). ( "Where the
attacker stands in an ongoing relation of sexual intimacy, that evil, as distinct from the
force used to compel submission, may well be thought qualitatively different"). See also
Michelle Anderson, MaritalImmunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper References:
A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 1465, 1512 (2003) (noting
victims of marital rape often receive little support from family and friends).
89 Actual surveys of victims of marital rape reveal that in fact the injury and trauma
can be more severe than in stranger rape. See RUSSELL, supra note 29, at 192 (noting
that52% of women raped by a husband or other relative report long-term trauma, as
compared to 39% of women raped by strangers); see also DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI
YLLO, LICENSE TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WIVES 135-37 (1985) (explaining that much of

the public does not consider marital rape as serious as stranger rape because of the
relationship between the parties).
90 Schafran, supra note 27, at 1021 ("The fear of repeated attacks is especially severe
because, unless the wife immediately leaves or is able to force the man to leave, she must
live with not only the rape, but also the rapist.").
91 Schafran, supra note 27, at 1019.
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jurors are reluctant to convict because of their belief in the tenets
92
of marriage and "[their] desire to promote that institution."
This goal is reflected in various state rape statutes. It is clearly
at work in the Virginia statute which permits dismissal of a
marital rape case upon the defendant's successful completion of
counseling "if the court finds such action will promote
maintenance of the family unit and be in the best interest of the
complaining witness."93
The distinctions made in some jurisdictions between married
partners who are living together, and those who are legally
separated, or living apart though still married also makes clear
the law's goal of promoting and preserving intact marriage. Once
the parties are separated, there is less interest in protecting their
privacy or most important, in promoting reconciliation. Further,
the goal of marital reconciliation is evident in statutes which
permit the exemption for forms of rape that do not require proof
of force, but permit prosecution of spouses when force is an
element. This distinction suggests that marital reconciliation is
still thought to be desirable if the sexual relations, though
nonconsensual, were not completed through force.
C. The Lying Woman
Current law also reflects a presumption that wives are likely to
lie about rape perpetrated by their husbands. This presumption
is most apparent in those statutes with heightened procedural
requirements for marital rape cases, such as shortened reporting
periods, but it is also present in all statutes which treat marital
rape less seriously than stranger rape. Of course, suspicion of
married women's rape accusations is an intensified version of the

92 See Eskow, supra note 88, at 701. As the American Prosecutors Research Institute,
the research, development and technical assistance arm of the National District Attorneys
Association, states in a guide for prosecutors conducting voir dire in marital and date rape
cases: "This is a difficult and tricky area for prosecutors. Unfortunately, many jurors
have difficulty with marital rape ... too many of them do not see it as a crime. The best
approach for this is to use hypothetical questions/scenarios, relating rape to other crimes
so that the stigmas & myths are debunked." American Prosecutors Research Institute,
Violence Against Women Program - Legal Issues/Resources: Voir Dire Questions,
available at http://www.ndaa.org/apri/programs/vawa/voir-dire-questions.html. See also
Harless, Note, supra note 32, at 320. Harless cites a marital rape case involving severe
violence which resulted in a jury acquittal.
93 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (2009).
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suspicion traditionally accorded complainants in all rape cases. 94
However, though it has become unacceptable to incorporate this
suspicion into rape statutes generally, the perception of women
as lying accusers remains codified in statutes covering marital
rape. Moreover, as defenders of the exemption have argued,
women pursuing marital rape charges are thought to have a
particular motive to lie: to obtain leverage in a divorce or custody
action. 95 This image of the untrustworthy woman also pervades
public attitudes. 9 6 Jurors routinely doubt women who allege
marital rape, because they do not behave like "real" victims or
could not truly have lacked consent.

94 See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 52 (traditional elements of rape prosecutions,
including corroboration requirements, proof of resistance and lack of consent, as well as
testimony on sexual history of victim, derived from belief that women are "spiteful shrews
who often falsely accuse innocent men of sexual attacks"); SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 54
(1987) (heightened requirements in rape cases are the "institutionalization of the law's
distrust of women victims through rules of evidence and procedure"). See also 1
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (Philadelphia, Robert H.
Small 1 t Am. Ed. 1847) (1736) ("[Rape] is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be
proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.").
95 See Protecting Them From Themselves, supra note 42, at 1475 & n.37. See also
Lonsway, Archambault & Lisak, supra note 27 at 2-3 (noting how perception of the
number of false reports in sexual assault cases is greatly exaggerated, while estimates of
the percentage of false reports actually are 2 to 8%). See Lonsway, Archambault & Lisak,
supra note 27, at 4-5 (discussing the importance of noting that a rape charge that is not
pursued by police or prosecutors is not equivalent to one that is "false."); Schafran, supra
note 27, at 1010. See also Lonsway, Archambault & Lisak, supra note 27, at 4, 5
(explaining police or prosecutors may not proceed if they determine a case to be
inconclusive or unsubstantiated, which itself can be affected by law enforcement
misperception and biases). See also Schafran, supra note 27, at 1011 & n.123(citing Rene
Augustine, Marriage:The Safe Haven for Rapists, 29 J. FAM. L. 559, 564 (1990-9 1)) (most
marital rape charges did not survive investigation by police). See RAPE IN AMERICA,
supra note 27, at 6 (noting problem is actually the lack of reporting of incidents, and
finding that 84% of all rape victims did not report the rape to police.); Schafran, supra
note 27, at 1014 (citing Senate Judiciary Committee report which found that only 7% of
all rapes were reported, as compared to 53% of all robberies).
96 While not spousal rape cases, the publicity surrounding the acquaintance rape
charges in the Kobe Bryant and Duke lacrosse players cases makes clear the suspicions
cast upon complainants in non-stranger rape cases generally. See, e.g., Mary Jo Melone,
Bryant Case May Inflict Lasting Harm on Women, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004,
http://tampabay.com (Enter "Bryant Case May Inflict Lasting Harm on Women" into
archives); Anita L. Allen, Blaming the Victim, THE STAR-LEDGER, May 14, 2006 at 5. See
also Lonsway, Archambault & Lisak, supra note 27, at 3: "We have all seen how victims
are portrayed in the media accounts of rape accusations made against popular sports and
cultural figures. These media accounts show us just how easy it is for us as a society to
believe the suspect's statements (a respectable cultural icon) and both discount the
victim's statements and disparage her character." Id.
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D. The Lessons for Domestic Violence
It is easy to see in the current treatment of marital and
intimate partner rape the ongoing power of the historical
rationales for exempting such rapes from prosecution. Such
rationales underlie the distinctions made in the formal law,
explain the low prosecution and conviction rates in these cases,
and are sometimes expressed directly by jurors and
representatives of our criminal justice system.
Continuing
unequal treatment of marital rape is directly traceable to the
historically unequal treatment of women, and married women in
particular.
The connection between this historical inequality and our
current treatment of domestic violence may be less apparent to
some. It may seem that the domestic violence reforms of the late
20th century have rid our laws and policies of the remnants of
historical rationales for violence against women and treatment of
married women as the dependents of their husbands. We may
wish to distance domestic violence law from the current
backward status of marital rape.
But the histories of marital rape and domestic violence law are
closely bound. They share the historical justifications of
coverture and marital privacy, and even the justifications that
seem to pertain more specifically to marital rape - the ongoing
consent theory and the image of the lying woman - have
resonance in the legal treatment of domestic violence. The
presumption of ongoing consent, first developed by Lord Hale, is
closely related to the conception of marriage that was reflected in
the law of coverture. While the presumption of consent is not an
overt element in the law of domestic violence, the narrowly
defined gender roles in marriage of which this presumption is a
part, also encompass the wifely responsibility to obey her
husband. Through marriage, the wife has consented to obey and
accept her husband's treatment. To make an accusation of
domestic violence is to step out of that agreed-upon role, and to
violate that consent. In this sense, the toleration of domestic
violence also carries with it the historical presumption of
consent.
The figure of the lying woman, while perhaps more prevalent
in rape law and intimate partner rapes in particular, also is a
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common trope of domestic violence law. The belief that women
make false accusations of abuse to win custody or divorce
lawsuits, or simply as an act of vindictiveness, is commonplace in
the justice system's treatment of domestic violence. 97
The historical legacy of unequal treatment of women remains
present in the unfinished business of domestic violence law and
policy. Just as martial rape is not truly considered "real" rape,
perhaps we do not think that domestic violence deserves to be
This may help to explain our
considered a "real" crime.
reluctance to fully implement domestic violence arrest and
prosecution policies and to enforce protection orders. If domestic
violence is ever to be fully addressed, we need to examine the
unstated assumptions about women that we like to think we
have long abandoned. We need to go back to thinking about
women's equality.
CONCLUSION

When we look closely at the differential treatment of marital
rape and the justifications that underlie those differences, the
failure of our justice system to treat all violence against women
seriously comes into full relief. What would our world be like if
we actually considered marital rape a crime equal in seriousness
to stranger rape, or to aggravated assault, or to any other violent
felony? And if we aren't willing to consider marital rape a real
crime, then how can we consider domestic violence generally to
be one? Criminalization of domestic violence represents a step
97 See, e.g., Deborah M. Goelman, Shelter from the Storm: Using Jurisdictional
Statutes to Protect Victims of Domestic Violence after the Violence Against Women Act of
2000, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 101, 167 (2004) (noting underlying belief in legal
profession that women lie about domestic violence, arguing that "this attitude often is
reflected by judges reluctant to grant protection orders when a divorce is pending,
believing that women misuse the protection order system to gain an advantage in custody
litigation"); Leigh Goodmark, Telling Stories, Saving Lives: The Battered Mothers'
Testimony Project, Women's Narratives, and Court Reform, 37 ARIZ. ST. L J. 709, 741-42
(2005) ("[b]attered mothers confront the same skepticism about their credibility as other
women, but their testimony is further shadowed by myths and stereotypes about victims
of domestic violence"); Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial
Anomaly: Between "The Truly National and the Truly Local," 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1122
(2001) (citing bias by judges who often believe in the "fallacy' of domestic violence claims
and the lack of trustworthiness of women who file them"); see id. at 1122 n.223 (despite
these beliefs, there appear to be no empirical studies to support the charge that women
routinely fabricate abuse allegations, while there are studies demonstrating that
"documented instances of women abusing the protective order process are rare and in any
event, no greater than any other crimes).
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forward in the fight to end violence against women. But it
remains plagued by a false hope - that the heritage of coverture,
of condoning marital violence in the name of privacy, and of
presuming that women in marriage do not have autonomy-has
been discarded. Continued progress in the domestic violence
movement requires that we dive back into this history and
challenge its ongoing hold on the full achievement of equal rights
for women. Otherwise the "bad, not so old days" of my client's
case will never fully disappear.

